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THESIS

REFUGEE OPERATIONS:
CULTURES IN CONFLICT

by

Patrick E. Garren
and
Frank G. Helmick

December 1982

Thesis Advisors: R. A. McGonigal
J. W. Creighton

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Information was gathered from official records, periodicals, and personal interviews with a variety of participants. These

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The results of this project clearly reveal that serious incidents occurred in all Cuban refugee centers. Cultural issues surrounding the serious incidents were discussed and contributing factors developed. An examination of the contributing factors using cultural concepts was also presented.

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Refugee Operations: Cultures in Conflict

by

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ---------- 10

A. GENERAL SUBJECT ---------- 10

B. HISTORICAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION ---------- 11

C. "FREEDOM FLOATILLA" ---------- 12

D. THESIS INTENT ---------- 13

E. RELEVANCE OF THESIS ---------- 14

F. DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS ---------- 15

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ---------- 17

A. EDWARD SAPIR ---------- 17

B. SIGMUND FREUD ---------- 18

C. D. F. KUNZ ---------- 19

D. BATTELLE COLUMBUS LABS ---------- 19

E. AFTER ACTION REPORTS ---------- 21

F. EDWARD T. HALL ---------- 22

1. Culture ---------- 23

2. The TRIAD ---------- 24

3. Communication ---------- 27

G. OTHER LITERATURE ---------- 31

H. CRITIQUE - APPLICATION TO THESIS ---------- 32

III. METHODOLOGY ---------- 35

A. ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE ---------- 35

B. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ---------- 37

IV. RESULTS--THE SERIOUS INCIDENTS ---------- 40

A. UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURES ---------- 40
B. ASSAULTS/WEAPONS ---------- 41
C. RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS ---------- 44
1. Eglin Air Force Base, Florida ---------- 44
2. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas ---------- 44
3. Fort McCoy, Wisconsin ---------- 46
D. OTHER ---------- 48
1. Sexual Misconduct ---------- 49
2. Arson ---------- 50
3. Theft ---------- 50
4. Self-inflicted Wounds ---------- 50
V. DISCUSSION--CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ---------- 52
A. DEMOGRAPHICS ---------- 53
1. Classification ---------- 54
2. Undesirables ---------- 57
B. PROCESSING ---------- 58
1. Expectations ---------- 59
2. Interpreters ---------- 61
3. Contexting ---------- 62
C. INTERNAL CONFLICT ---------- 64
1. Self Protection ---------- 64
2. Temperament ---------- 66
3. Geography ---------- 67
4. Government ---------- 67
5. Material Equity ---------- 70

D. LAW ENFORCEMENT ---------- 70
1. Legal Considerations ---------- 71
2. Punishment ---------- 73
3. Staffing ---------- 74
E. COMMUNICATIONS ---------- 75
1. Sources ---------- 76
2. Rumors ---------- 77
VI. CONCLUSION ---------- 79
A. THE SERIOUS INCIDENTS ---------- 79
B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ---------- 80
C. COMPENDIUM ---------- 82
APPENDIX A: FORT MCCOY SERIOUS INCIDENTS ---------- 84
APPENDIX B: FORT CHAFFEE SERIOUS INCIDENTS ---------- 87
APPENDIX C: FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SERIOUS INCIDENTS --- 89
APPENDIX D: EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE SERIOUS INCIDENTS -- 90
APPENDIX E: INTERVIEWS ---------- 91
LIST OF REFERENCES ---------- 98
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ---------- 100

LIST OF TABLES

I. Legend ---------- 92

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Cultural TRIAD or Pyramid ---------- 24

2.2 Context Bandwidth ---------- 30

4.1 Weapons Confiscated July, 1980, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin ---------- 43

4.2 Location of the Major Cuban Refugee Centers ---- 45

4.3 A Demonstration, September 3, 1980, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin ---------- 48

5.1 Refugee Arrival at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, June, 1980 ---------- 60

5.2 Fort McCoy Internal Security Force, July 1980 -- 69

5.3 Juvenile Section Fence, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin -- 74

6.1 Refugees at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin on July 4, 1980 ---------- 83

I. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL SUBJECT

A poster distributed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had a picture of Albert Einstein with the following caption: "It's not a shame to be a refugee, it can happen to anyone." The damaging effects of brutal uprooting, of homelessness and, what's worse, being stateless leave permanent marks on body and soul. [Ref. 1: p. 348]

The fact that millions of men, women and children are living day to day in crowded refugee camps is a human tragedy of enormous proportions. To understand just what it means to be a refugee one must go beyond the numbers, the nationalities and ideologies, and focus on the simple fact that refugees were ordinary human beings long before they were refugees. Like all people, they were born into families and communities and adhered to traditional cultural beliefs. Confucius said: "Nature of men is identical; what divides them is their customs." [Ref. 2: p. ii]

Throughout the history of mankind, people have been uprooted against their will. Time and again lives and values, built from generation to generation, have been shattered without warning. Time and again, people in fear, individuals or groups persecuted on account of their profound convictions have had to make a most dramatic decision: to take the

uncertain, even perilous road to exile, from home and community and homeland, from friends and often family, rather than bear the intolerable burdens of injustice and oppression. [Ref. 3: p. i]

The United States is by far the largest contributor to organizations assisting refugees. The United States also leads the world in total number of refugees resettled. For example, in FY-81, ending September 30, 1981, the U.S. admitted 154,000 legal refugees although 217,000 were authorized. [Ref. 4: p. 39]

B. HISTORICAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION

The United States history of refugee operations dates back to the time of the Indians' movement from their homeland. The Indian Removal Act in 1830 began the first major involvement of the United States military in refugee operations. Initially the Bureau of Indian Affairs was established in the War Department, and even when it was moved to the Department of the Interior, the United States military constantly played a part in the enforcement of the reservation boundaries. These reservations were foreign to the Indians and could be considered the first large scale United States military involvement in refugee operations.

The military has been continually saddled with the mission of establishing refugee centers. This is illustrated by the recent refugee operations in Korea and Vietnam. The military

played an integral part in the success or failure of these operations. In the last ten years the military has been given the mission to operate centers for the Vietnamese "boat people" and the Cuban "freedom floatilla". While the mandate of the military is far from clear and its field of responsibility is not well defined, the probability is high that United States military will function as an essential factor in any future mass influx of refugees.

C. "FREEDOM FLOATILLA"

This thesis focuses on the latest major refugee operation involving the United States military and numerous volunteer and governmental agencies. Over 1 million Cubans left their homeland between the revolution in 1959 and the start of the 1980 boatlift. Of this number approximately 850,000 came to the United States as refugees. In April of 1980, the massive influx of over 125,000 undocumented Cubans coming by small boat from the port of Maried provided a massive challenge for the people of the United States and the agencies which played an integral part in the creation and operation of the centers.

This ragtag armada of fishing boats loaded with refugees placed the President of the United States in a dilemma. An effort to block entry of large numbers of refugees fleeing communist oppression would be seen by many as a retreat from his longstanding human-rights commitment. On the other hand, the President had to decide if the American society could

absorb the massive influx of Cuban immigrants during a period of economic uncertainty. On 4 April, the United States agreed to accept 10,000 Cuban dissidents who were seeking refuge in the Peruvian embassy. Because of their activity in Cuba, Castro challenged the Carter administration on 22 April to accept as many Cuban refugees as could find passage [Ref. 5: p. 41].

D. THESIS INTENT

The intent of this thesis is to develop the cultural indicators which may predict undesirable phenomena inside refugee centers. During the initial phase of refugee operations, emotions and anxiety levels are high and certainty is at best ambiguous. The smallest of actions by either the refugees or the administrators may result in an undesirable phenomenon. "Undesirable phenomenon" or a serious incident is defined as any event which poses an active threat to established law and order within the center and which endangers the well-being of the refugees, civilians and military personnel.* These serious incidents range from illicit sexual acts to full gang warfare. These incidents proved to be dysfunctional to meet the needs of a smooth and orderly resettlement process.

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*The initial definition was derived from official military message traffic which was reported to higher headquarters.

If nothing more, this thesis will provide a unique archival document of the Cuban refugee operation analyzed from multiple sources and perspectives. It is hoped that a common list of cultural and behavioral indicators which lead to serious incidents will be revealed. This list of serious incident predictors should be of value to those who are given the mission to establish a refugee center.

E. RELEVANCE OF THESIS

The most important aspect of any refugee operation is failure to learn from previous experiences. The Cuban operation indicated that camps are still laid out in grid fashion, despite the preponderance of evidence suggesting that this is the worst possible layout. Refugee camp management and administration is often unenlightened with respect to refugee culture, customs and communication patterns.

Recent events in the world often have had tragic consequences for those forced to flee their native lands. Refugees are casualties of war and peace. Victims of violence of every kind--wars, revolutions, struggles for political power, border settlements and peace treaties. While such research does not lend itself to formal generalizable propositions, it intends to give the "feeling for the situation" of the refugee engaged in what may be a dehumanizing process. Refugees are just ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances [Ref. 6: p. 40].

Management of refugee centers has had historically one goal, that is to provide a holding area which will sustain the refugees for a short time until a sponsor can be found. More enlightened managers have realized that some refugees could become valuable resources. Helping the refugees adjust and teaching them how to become valuable citizens may be beneficial to the host country in the long term.

The cultural issues and concepts we are attempting to analyze in this thesis may have applications in any environment involving the interaction of two different cultures. The factors contributing to the "undesirable phenomena" in a refugee center may be found today in any inner city in the United States and in military operations overseas.

F. DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The introductory chapter of this thesis presents a brief history of military involvement in refugee operations while establishing the importance of such an operation.

Chapter II is a brief review of existing literature in the field of refugee operations and cross-cultural conflicts. The authors analyzed the refugee operation through a multitude of cultural concepts formulated by anthropologist E. T. Hall. They are discussed in greater detail in this chapter.

Chapter III is a description of the methodology employed to accomplish the data gathering for the results and analysis.

Chapters IV and V contain the results and analysis. The results are analyzed in Chapter V applying the cultural concepts discussed in Chapter II. The results are examined for generalizability to cross-cultural interaction.

Chapter VI, the conclusion, includes a list of serious incidents as well as a list of indicators for these incidents. A series of questions is provided as a tool to aid management in a multi-cultural environment.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A number of journals and documents have been published concerning the plight of refugees. Few of these documents concern themselves with the task of establishing or operating a refugee center. Those that do address this critical issue are usually documents of times, dates, and places, with little or no consideration given to the refugees' perspective.

This thesis focuses on the most recent literature available concerning refugee operations. The primary literature sources are official after action reports, periodicals, and published works concerning culture, learning, and communication. E. T. Hall is a major contributor.

A. EDWARD SAPIR

Edward Sapir revolutionized linguistic theory and ultimately language teaching methods as a direct consequence of having to deal with problems that come from the study of the "primitive language" [Ref. 7: p. 72]. He is famous for being the man who laid foundations of modern descriptive linguistics [Ref. 7: p. 85].

Sapir also investigated phenomena concerning the relation of man to the so-called objective world. He suggests it is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is

merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent built on the language of groups. [Ref. 8: p. 87]

In his writings, he stressed that the concept of language is the greatest force of socialization. The fact that a common speech serves as a peculiarly potential symbol of the social solidarity of those who speak the language. He dealt with the psychological significance of common speech and the subform of a language which is current among a group of people who are held together by ties of common interest. [Ref. 9: p. 15] These groups of people are influenced greatly by the makeup of their language, their vocabulary, and their grammar. Many English speaking people lose sight of this fact. Since language according to Sapir is the greatest force of socialization, its impact on refugee operations must be considered.

B. SIGMUND FREUD

A psychologist whose works addressed the conscious and unconscious levels in cultural communications was Sigmund Freud. Freud distinguished between conscious and unconscious material. His achievement was his elaborate analysis of the role of the unconscious. Freud relied heavily on the communicative significance of man's acts rather than his words. [Ref. 7: p. 83]

Freud was seen by some to lack in only one area--that was his theory of communication. Ultimately everything man does involves interaction with someone else. Interaction lies at the hub of the universe of culture and everything grows from it. This interaction can not take place if there is a lack of communication or difficulties in communication in intercultural relations.

C. D. F. KUNZ

One theorist who has specifically studied the refugee problem is D. F. Kunz. In his book The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement, Kunz suggests refugee movement can be classified as anticipatory and acute. Anticipatory refugees are those who leave their home in an orderly way after some type of preparation. Acute refugees are those who flee in the wake of massive political and military upheaval. These refugees flee en masse or in bursts of groups with emphasis on escape. Kunz also suggests that acute refugees may face more difficult problems of adjustment than anticipatory groups. [Ref. 10: p. 58] Once the movement of these refugees is complete, the refugees merge and form unique groups. The Cuban refugee movement was composed of both acute and anticipatory refugees.

D. BATTELLE COLUMBUS LABS

A group of researchers from the Battelle company developed a study, Civil Interaction During Military Operations in

Built-up Areas, which concerns the role of the military in the case of an armed conflict. Key to our interest in this study are chapters dedicated to the handling and movement of refugees. These chapters may be applied directly to the Cuban refugee movement concerning the cultural phenomena which existed.

One of the gravest mistakes which might be made in civil affairs operations is to approach a heterogenous, complex society as if it were a homogenous, simplistic mass of people. Along with the anticipated problems of status differential along the lines of political beliefs, economic worth, and social station, societies can be further stratified along such lines as religion, ethnicity, and race [Ref. 11: p. 93].

Without understanding these different aspects of culture, the potential for conflict is greatly increased. Each society is characterized by a set of loyalties of beliefs, ideals, institutions, groups, and individuals. These must be taken into consideration.

In conjunction with the cultural problems, proximic problems are discussed in the Battelle study. If people are to work effectively in densely populated areas (e.g. a refugee center), they must bridge the gap between spatial thinking dealing with the physical environment and spatial thinking dealing with values.

The study suggests that densely populated areas have three aspects that change over time and that must be

considered: Normative or cultural aspects, functional or organizational aspects, and the physical aspects [Ref. 11: p. 8]. These ideas are parallel to "TRIAD" concepts discussed in Section F-2 of this chapter.*

E. AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Little has been written concerning either of the last two military involved refugee operations, the Vietnamese "boat people" and Cuban "freedom floatilla", other than after action and news reports. The official after action reports provide some insight into problems but it is limited to the perspective of the "officials".

After action reports were obtained from four Cuban centers and four Vietnamese centers. Although these reports are largely written as factual histories, some insight into cultural problems is presented. The logistic problems were considered immense, but solvable. An examination of the serious events and problems presented in both operations reveal some identical cultural factors and will be used for comparison throughout this thesis. Considerable documentation was found concerning the following refugee centers: Fort Indiantown Gap (Vietnamese, May-December 1975), Fort Indiantown Gap (Cuban, May-October 1980), Fort Chaffee

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*The authors suggest the three levels of the TRIAD are similar to the three aspects that change over time. The formal level is similar to the normative or cultural aspects, the informal level to the functional, and technical level to the physical aspects.

(Vietnamese, April-December 1975), Fort Chaffee (Cuba, May-February 1980), Eglin Air Force Base (Vietnamese, April-August 1975), Eglin Air Force Base (Cuban, May-September 1980), Camp Orte (Vietnamese, April-June 1975), and Fort McCoy (Cuban, May-October 1980).

Of special interest in all of the after action reports was the section provided by the G-5*, or Civil Affairs staff. Their insights and perceptions were critical to the success of refugee operations.

F. EDWARD T. HALL

Edward T. Hall, an anthropologist, is the theorist whose ideas closely align themselves with the direction of this thesis. His theory includes how people from different cultures have unconscious, ingrained assumptions about personal space, interpersonal relations, and the function of time. Those different assumptions work to make misunderstandings between peoples likely and destructive. He stated that culture has three levels: formal, informal, and technical. Hall believes that a culture is made up of formal behavior patterns that contribute a core around which there are certain informal adaptations. He developed a "TRIAD", which is a map of the change process of a culture. These theories

*The G-5 is the principle staff assistant to the commander in all matters pertaining to political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations.

will be discussed in greater detail in the paragraphs to follow.

Edward T. Hall authored three books that provide a frame of reference to examine refugee centers and operations. The three books are: The Silent Language, (1959), Doubleday and Company, Inc.; The Hidden Dimension, (1966), Doubleday and Company, Inc.; and Beyond Culture, (1977), Anchor Press, Doubleday. These allow for the development of a method to analyze serious incidents and cultural problems in the Cuban operation.

1. Culture

In order to get a grasp on the dynamics of culture and intercultural relations a sound definition is needed. Hall defines culture as a complex series of activities interrelated in many ways with origins deeply buried in the past [Ref. 7: p. 80]. In his book, The Silent Language, Hall describes how anthropologists perceive culture. "For anthropologists, culture has long stood for the way of life of a people, for the sum of their learned behavior patterns, attitudes, and material things". [Ref. 7: p. 43]

In his examination, Hall describes peoples' behavior with regard to time. These behaviors can be classified as either polychronic or monochronic. A monochronic culture is one in which the people handle events on an individual and linear schedule. A polychronic culture is one in which the

people seem comfortable immersed in multiple events simultaneously. Polychronic cultures are not time intense people.

2. The TRIAD

The TRIAD is a concept which helps explain what must happen in the change process of different cultures. Culture in Hall's perspective has three levels: formal, informal, and technical.

When we view this TRIAD it resembles a pyramid. It is noted that the formal level of culture makes the largest portion. Within this level the adult molds the young according to the pattern he himself has never questioned. Everybody can depend upon it almost as though it were intuitive. It is the base from which the rest of the culture springs and around which it is built [Ref. 7: pp. 91-101].



Figure 2.1. Cultural TRIAD or Pyramid.

Informal learning is more within the subliminal level of consciousness. Mishandling the informal can often lead to serious difficulties which are apt to become aggravated since the participants in an informal situation are not fully conscious of what is going on. Our lives are full of customs which we do not understand. Why we wear neckties is not understood. We violate these norms, however, at considerable risk. Most of what we know in high context culture is contained at this level. This is why it is so hard to discover!

The technical level of culture is reduced to conscious levels of specific skills and procedures. One can introduce change in technical frame and not violate the norms of a culture. Technical changes are small and deal with details of the operation. They are always conscious [Ref. 7: p.]08].

The change process is a complex circular process. It moves from informal to technical and seems to involve all three levels. The deeper one goes into a particular culture, the slower any change effort may be expected to take place. Hall's most helpful advice is to begin with the informal, attempt to bring particular problems from the informal to the technical level where they may be consciously acted upon and changed accordingly.

It is doubtful that anyone can actually change a culture. What takes place are small incremental changes in

the informal level until they "alter" the culture. An example of this is the steady improvements in the computer industry which were undreamed of twenty years ago. On the other hand, if one wants to help introduce cultural change he should find out what is happening on the informal level. Determine which of these informal adaptations are most successful, and bring these to an awareness level. This process will not change culture, but may accelerate the change. It is this out-of-awareness level in which all change begins. [Ref. 7: p. 118]

Those who previously studied the past refugee operations and those who actually operated the centers had little, if any, idea of how different cultures perceive one another. The excuse given in almost every operation is that there was little or no time to review the literature concerning the cultures. One must be made aware that two cultures treat the same point of behavior quite differently and structure the informal level into different parts of their respective systems. When events of a magnitude such as that of a refugee operation depend on such small understandings, it seems transparent that one of the most promising developments in the intercultural field has to do with research directed toward bringing informal patterns to a level of awareness. This is where the problems arise. Hall suggests the informal expectancy is often ruptured when there is conflict between

two patterns within the context of our own culture or in the more familiar case of a cross-cultural situation [Ref. 7: p. 105].

3. Communication

In conjunction with this TRIAD, Hall developed concepts to deal with intercultural communications. Hall stated, "There exists in the world today tremendous distortions in meaning as men try to communicate to one another. The job of achieving understanding and insight into mental processes of others is much more difficult and the situation more serious than most of us care to admit." The problems involving communication are a result of the fact that communication occurs simultaneously on different levels of consciousness, ranging from full awareness to out of awareness [Ref. 7: p. 52]. To aid in analyzing communication between cultures, Hall developed three concepts. These theoretical paradigms are proxemics, action chains, and the high-low context spectrum.

a. Proxemics

Proxemics is the study of man's social and personal space. Hall's proxemic research cast doubts on the validity of the assumptions that when two human beings experience the same event, virtually the same data is being fed to the two brains and recorded similarly. Hall suggests how proxemic patterns in cultures differ and how use of space

is a specialized elaboration of culture [Ref. 8: pp. 1-2]. If the military is tasked to establish refugee centers, proxemics provides a tool to aid in understanding the refugee's perception of the camp. Hall stated that by examining proxemic patterns, it is possible to reveal hidden cultural frames that determine the structure of a given people's perceptual world. This different perception affects what is considered crowded living, different interpersonal relations, and different approaches to those with other proxemic patterns [Ref. 8: p. 153].

Hall states territorial behavior for cultures is fixed and remains reasonably constant as to the locations for specific activities within one's territory.* He also illustrates how the territory is an extension of the organism which is marked by visual, vocal, and olfactory signs. This idea is congruous with the statement made by Sir Winston Churchill when he said, "We shape our buildings and they shape us." [Ref. 8: p. 100]

In Hall's book The Hidden Dimension there is a discussion of crowding and social behavior in animals, which has direct application on the subject of this thesis. He discusses Calhoun's 1958 experiments with rats, and crowded spaces. The effect of crowding produced stress in the rats and a "behavioral sink" or gross distortion of behavior,

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*Examples are eating, sleeping, and nesting.

started to appear. This effect increased aggression in the animals. Two very important observations materialized. First, that a rat, like man, needs time to be alone, and secondly, the social rank in a sink is very unstable. [Ref. 8: pp. 24-27]

b. Action Chains

An action chain is a set of sequence of events in which usually two or more individuals participate. It resembles a dance, except that it is a dance with a goal. If we fail to follow the sequence or steps, the chain is broken and the action must begin over again.

Anglo-American disputes follow in steps from politeness, to messages via a third party, to verbal confrontation, then legal action, and finally, force if nothing else has worked and if the law is on your side. For Spanish-Americans the sequence is different. First there is brooding where verbal confrontation is to be avoided, and the first indication that there is a problem is a show of force. [Ref. 12: p. 57]

As mentioned in the TRIAD, action chains occur through the three levels of a culture. Hall describes the continuum of action chains as ranging from those at one end of the spectrum when the commitment to complete the chain is haphazard at best, to those at the other end of the spectrum, which is a relentless progression set in motion and there is not any turning away [Ref. 12: p. 146].

c. High and Low Context

One of the most useful concepts to describe cultures is the use of the high and low-context spectrum created by Hall in his book Beyond Culture. "A high-context communication is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context communication or message is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code." [Ref. 12: p. 91] While there are no cultures specifically at either extreme on the scale, some can be considered high while others can be considered low. For example, Americans, Germans and Swiss would be considered low context, while Arabic and Japanese would be considered high-context. The Cuban and Latin culture would fall somewhere on the right side of the scale. (See Figure 2.2) According to Hall, the level of context determines everything about the nature of the communication.



Figure 2.2. Context Bandwidth.

The language code demonstrates how context is utilized in the communications of a culture. In low-context cultures the words carry most of the meaning while in high-context cultures, less information is carried in the words and more in the context. Low-context cultures such as ours deal in specific procedures and legalistic methods, while high-context cultures are less legalistic and are more influenced by networks of friends and relatives [Ref. 12: p. 107]. Nearly everything in a low-context society can be codified--put into print--while the opposite is true in a high-context culture. For example, there is no informal written Arabic language.

G. OTHER LITERATURE

Several other readings provided background for this thesis. To Serve the Devil, by Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, vividly documents the white Americans' racial perceptions of the history of the minorities in America. Of special note is the chapter concerning the American Indian with the Department of Interior viewing its role as "paternal". Unlike the military, they were not committed to the physical destruction of the Indians; all they wanted to do was wipe them out, culturally, and impose upon them all values of the white society. [Ref. 2: p. 69]

Another useful document was the United States Army field manual FM 41-10, (1969) Civil Affairs Operations [Ref. 13].

This manual is the official reference for G-5/Civil Affairs personnel in the conduct of civil affairs operations. It elaborates on the functions of the Civil Affairs units in a conflict environment. There is little guidance for operations such as the domestic refugee influx into this country.

A third beneficial work was a collection of articles on Inter-American cultural factors edited by Samuel Shapiro [Ref. 14]. This collection centers on how business, politics, the military, education, and religion have produced a split in the cultures of the United States with the Latin culture.

H. CRITIQUE - APPLICATION TO THESIS

The literature used in preparation of this thesis is segregated into two distinct categories. The first, composed largely of the concepts provided by Edward T. Hall, and the second, the official after action reports. This literature expresses two diametrically opposed diagnostic lenses. The after action report being factual and having little cause and effect relationship between the cultural problems and Hall's theories and concepts having little direct mention of refugee operations, but providing in depth thinking into possible explanation of the refugee phenomena. The authors hope to investigate the virgin region that links theoretical thoughts with pragmatic concepts.

The official after action reports played an important role in data collection by highlighting the events and problems

that occurred, as well as providing insight into our own culture. These reports reveal the use of a low-context approach in solving problems with a high-context culture. The reports also provide substantial data concerning serious incidents, and is the initial impetus and direction for the data gathering portion of this thesis.

In summary, Hall suggests a variety of lenses may be used to examine a change in cultures. For example, the failure to understand the action chain of the refugee's culture may contribute to misunderstandings and possible conflict. The "officials" anticipated the actions of refugees to be identical to that of North Americans. The concepts of action chain, high/low context, proxemics, and the TRIAD may help us develop an underlying cause for conflict in the refugee centers. In addition, these concepts may help explain why demonstrations, riots, assaults, and other serious phenomena suddenly surfaced unexpectedly.

The intention of this thesis is to examine the serious incidents which occurred at refugee centers through a multiple lens perspective based on the cultural theories of Hall. Previous researchers have failed to take into consideration the aspects of both overt and covert culture. Failure to address cultural considerations when working with different cultures results in a high risk that conflict may occur. Culture is the link between human beings and the means they have of interacting with others. If the inhabitant's culture

is not taken into consideration, especially in the dynamic area of refugee operations, a human tragedy may result.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE

Since the focus of this thesis concerns a situation not ongoing; i.e., military involvement in domestic refugee operations, a historical perspective and largely an archival strategy limits the research scope. The uniqueness of the operations resulted in a small number of applicable cases which may be analyzed. Therefore, the majority of information was accumulated from the Cuban and Vietnamese refugee operations.* Information was gathered from a variety of sources to include: telephone interviews with officials, after action reports from domestic refugee operations, personal interviews with officials, current literature, official message traffic, military manuals, numerous periodical articles, newspaper articles, unpublished materials obtained from officials, international organization documents, and interviews with participants to include refugees.

The research was guided by both the inside and outside perspective since one of the authors was an active participant in the Cuban operation. His involvement provided a unique insight in many of the cultural problems encountered,

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*Due to the ease of access and availability of data at Fort McCoy, an indepth investigation utilizing that specific center was conducted.

but may have been a source of bias during the conduct of the research. The other author provided the "other perspective" which was needed for a more objective design.

The first step of the analytic process was to draw a time line of the operations and identify the undesirable phenomena which occurred. This process was used as a reference for the in depth interviews as well as a direction of the data gleemed from other sources listed.

The focus of the data collection effort was centered on uncovering the contributing factors for serious incidents. This list of factors, which were considered to be "contributing to cultural conflict:, surfaced from the data collected. Using Hall's concepts, the data was analyzed through a cultural lens and critical issues were determined. Carrying out this process a list of cultural factors was developed for each event. If the same undesirable phenomena occurred at different centers and similar cultural factors were identified to be neglected across the centers, then this would become a significant consideration to place on a list of cultural predictors for military staffs.

A critical part of the data collection method is the role which the authors place on theory. The more explicit the theory, the more complete the diagnosis and the more reliable the inquiry. Hall's concepts provided a process to think through our analytical methods on the front end to help reduce the amount of uncertainty.

B. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

The sample size used for this thesis is limited (n=8). Each center is taken as one independent observation although many interviews might have been conducted there. These refugee operations were limited by the fact that the military staff assigned the mission were active, although reluctant, players in the operations. Interviews were thus less than enthusiastic at times. Another weakness identified by the authors was that the heavy weight of the primary data was collected at one location, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

The reliability of the data can be questioned from several perspectives. All sources (interviews, official documents, newspaper articles, official military message traffic) have a possibility of bias and the effect of time itself can create bias. All interviews conducted were limited by the availability of resources and limited access to people. This could have an affect on the objectivity of the results. If there was a high degree of correlation among the sources, then there would be increased internal consistency, thus increasing its reliability. To aid in maintaining validity, investigation into primary source data had priority over secondary source data.

Most of the refugee operations which were used in this thesis lack adequate systematic data covering the period immediately after the refugee arrival in the United States.

Problems with the language and culture severely hampered efforts of collecting the systematic data from the refugees.

It must be noted the refugee centers were in operation for a relatively short period of time, thus creating further difficulties. Another problem found was that the refugee tends to forget or redefine many of the situations which they initially encountered. Other material used (newspapers, magazines, government reports, interviews with government officials) may focus only on what we (the United States culture) considers important, sensational and significant. Those accounts may not accurately reflect the refugees perceptions of their experiences. Just as in wars, the victors write the history--so here the staff writes the after action report.

Content validity would appear to be strong among the Cuban and Vietnamese refugee operations because the data was from the entire spectrum of events where all possible centers were considered. Any application beyond these two cultures may encounter problems if samples from other refugee operations are not used.

In the interest of validity, cause and effect relationship between factors and events was limited. The intent of this thesis was not to produce a definitive list of cause and effect factors, but rather a body of cultural factors which might aid military staffs to improve the operation of the refugee centers. Universality with cause and effect relationships was not the primary goal of the thesis; instead,

this would be a beginning of the documentation of a neglected topic for future researchers and scholars to address. Perhaps Hall summed it up best when he said, "When working with cultural data one can only be precise on one analytical level at a time and then for only one moment. I call this "cultural indeterminancy". [Ref. 7: p. 136] Although it seems the methodology for the research of this thesis has numerous explicit and implicit shortcomings, at least it is an initial step forward.

IV. RESULTS--THE SERIOUS INCIDENTS

This chapter contains an abridgment of events which are categorized as serious by the definition presented in the introduction.* The incidents were found in some degree at all of the refugee centers. They were revealed through primary and secondary source documents.** This chapter contains a factual description of the serious phenomena which include unauthorized departures, assaults and illegal weapons possession, riots and demonstrations, sexual misconduct, arson, theft, and self-inflicted wounds.

There are numerous examples of each type of serious incidents. In this chapter the rationale and reasons for the serious incidents were not included. The important fact is that they did occur! These incidents were categorized as serious by the "official" definition and does not represent the viewpoint of others involved including the refugees. The contributing factors and reasons will be discussed in the following chapter.

A. UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURES

Unauthorized departures, or "fence jumping" as it is commonly referred to at the centers, occurred on a continuous

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*See page 13.

**See page 17.

and at times uncontrollable rate. These departures ranged from individual departures to mass exit attempts. The following example illustrates the seriousness of the problem. Two Cubans who "jumped the fence" at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, were apprehended for breaking and entering the residence of the Lt. Governor of Pennsylvania.

The magnitude of the problem is exemplified by the number of unauthorized departures which occurred at Fort McCoy during the period of June 25, 1980, to September 19, 1980. Over 734 cases of fence jumping were reported, an average of 19 unauthorized departures per day.*

Another type of "fence jumping" occurred between various sections inside the center. Unauthorized internal movement, moving into and out of restricted sections, occurred on a daily basis and created massive accountability problems at all four centers. Separate sections had to be established by the management of the center to contain repeat offenders.

B. ASSAULTS/WEAPONS

Assaults and the manufacturing and possession of weapons** proved to be an area of great concern for the center's

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*Computed from official message traffic that was available, which averaged 19 cases per day. Data for consecutive days was not available.

**All refugees were searched and all weapons confiscated upon arrival at the four centers.

management. Assaults and weapons possession were common occurrences, especially in the unaccompanied male sections of the centers.

Assaults ranged from simple fist fight to stabbings and from sexual molestation to gang rapes. These assaults were reported throughout the entire population of the centers even to include the juvenile sections. At Fort McCoy, for example, there were over 48 cases of reported assaults with 41 refugees being injured.* Many serious injuries resulted from the use of "homemade" or fabricated weapons.

"Homemade" weapons were prevalent at each of the centers. At Fort Chaffee for example, 1400 homemade weapons** were confiscated during an inspection of the area on June 6, 1980 [Ref. 15: p. I-III-4]. Many knives were taken from the mess hall and potentially dangerous material was manufactured into deadly weapons by the refugees. Another example of the seriousness of the problem occurred at Fort McCoy. One week after the refugees arrived, a search of four barracks produced 256 homemade weapons.*** Weapons continued to be a major problem throughout the operation at Fort McCoy. Examples of the types of weapons fabricated in the center are shown in Figure 4.1.

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*Data computed from available message traffic.

**The weapons included knives, puncture type weapons, razor blades, machetes, and daggers.

***Interview with Civil Affairs Officer, August 21, 1982, Green Bay, Wisconsin. See Appendix E.



Figure 4.1. Weapons Confiscated July, 1980, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

The vast number of weapons held by the refugees, and the number of assaults resulted in managers of the centers spending an inordinate amount of time and resources in an attempt to control the problem.

C. RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Riots and demonstrations* were a particular concern for the management of all centers. These riots and demonstrations hampered the management effectiveness of the centers, caused property damage and injuries, and fueled political pressure from outside sources. During the summer of 1980 the four military centers experienced some form of riot and/or demonstration demanding deployment of additional security forces. Following are some specific examples of riots and demonstrations which occurred at the respective centers. The examples include the number of refugees involved, the number of injuries, and the "official rationale" for the cause.

1. Eglin Air Force Base; Florida

At Eglin Air Force Base on May 15, 1980, a rock-throwing protest occurred involving 200 refugees injuring 3 police and six refugees. The official reason given for the riot was slow resettlement procedures.

2. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, had four major incidents, one in which state troopers actually fired on refugees. The first riot involved between 200 to 300 young male refugees and occurred on May 26, 1980. The riot occurred across from

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*In a demonstration no property or persons are harmed; a riot, on the other hand, results in property and/or personal harm.



Figure 4.2. Location of the Major Cuban Refugee Centers.

the reception area for visiting families and apparently began when visiting families demanded the release of family members detained in the center. The refugees crossed rope barriers and left the centers with the result that four Cubans received injuries. The refugees who did not participate restored the overturned barriers.

Two days later a demonstration occurred involving an estimated 1,200 refugees. Just as with the previous incident, the cause given by officials was a result of slow out-processing procedures (only 205 out of 18,843 were out-processed) [Ref. 15: p. V-I-A-4]. The crowd dispersed after Cuban-Americans

entered the center to answer questions and explain procedures to the refugees.

The next night a crowd gathered and requested to speak to the two Cuban-Americans and then dispersed still frustrated with the slow out-processing procedures. During the same evening 150 to 200 refugees peacefully demonstrated along the main street of the post.

On May 31, 1980, 50 to 70 refugees stoned a United States Marshall's vehicle. This occurred when the marshalls apprehended one refugee for assaulting a military policeman. While this incident was in progress the military police detected a refugee starting a fire between the buildings and he was taken into custody.

At 1930 hours on June 1, 1980, approximately 1,000 Cubans marched to the Fort Chaffee main gate. For reasons unknwon, the Arkansas state troopers opened fire and injured five Cubans. Following this incident two buildings were destroyed by arson. Additional army and reserve component units were then requested and deployed to Fort Chaffee.

3. Fort McCoy, Wisconsin

At Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, on the evening of August 13, 1980, a group of 20 refugees armed with homemade weapons apparently attacked another group during a movie. A series of clashes erupted involving of up to 50 to 60 refugees. A military police reaction force had to be employed at the request of the United States Marshalls. By 0215 hours the

disturbances were over and 20 refugees were treated for injuries. The next day (August 14) two buildings were burned, one damaged extensively with arson suspected in both cases.

On September 7, 1980, approximately 300 refugees began demonstrating against the slow out-processing procedures. The demonstration began with 50 to 60 refugees carrying signs stating their desire to be resettled (See Figure 4.2). There were rumors among the refugees that one of the volunteer agencies (VOLAG) was selling sponsorships which fueled the demonstrations. As the crowd formed it began to shake the fence and eventually tore down the fence surrounding the male compound. Riot control agents were used on a limited basis in one area to turn back a group of refugees attempting to enter another section of the center. All available personnel in the military police battalion and the infantry battalion were committed to cordon the disturbance area, and by 2030 hours the disturbances was controlled. That evening two recreation buildings were burned. On September 8, 1980, another building was burned with arson suspected in all three fires.

On September 8, 1980, a group of 100 refugees began to move through the male compound. Military police and infantry troops were quick to seal the area and restore order. Twenty-three instigators were apprehended with five military police receiving minor injuries.



Figure 4.3. A Demonstration, September 3, 1980, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

D. OTHER

There were numerous other incidents which caused great concern in the operation of the refugee centers. These incidents differ from those previously discussed in that a single refugee rather than a group of refugees was involved. Many of these incidents occurred on a daily basis and were considered commonplace to some. For the purpose of this thesis

these incidents will be categorized as "other"* and examples are listed below.

1. Sexual Misconduct

The fact that the population of refugees contained a number of homosexuals is not in itself a serious incident. The actions that took place, however, did cause a great deal of anxiety among the refugees and administrators. For example, at Fort McCoy it was frequently observed by civilian employees and refugees that numerous gatherings of homosexuals occurred in a certain section of the center known as "Queer Hill". It was at this location where homosexual misconduct allegedly occurred.

Other examples of sexual misconduct which occurred at the centers included prostitution, indecent exposure, and numerous rapes. For example, at one center the installation commander observed a refugee standing on top of a building masturbating while eating a light bulb. It was not infrequent for masturbation and indecent exposure to occur in the presence of female employees during meal hours. One female worker was bitten on the buttocks while serving meals at a dining facility. While these incidents caused concern it was perceived little could be done to control them.

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*"Other" incidents in this context include sexual misconduct, arson, theft, and self-inflicted wounds.

2. Arson

Arson occurred at the centers while the refugees' population was involved in riots or demonstrations. Cases of arson ranged from the burning of barracks and administration buildings to small fires between buildings. One administration building was completely destroyed and fire officials concluded it was ignited by gasoline. Prior to this incident it was reported to administration officials that refugees were stealing gasoline with the intent to manufacture incendiary devices.

3. Theft

Thefts were a common occurrence at each center. The spectrum of thefts ranged from minor items such as government issued cigarettes to major high dollar items such as a Pennsylvania fish and game vehicle. Knives, which were used in the dining facilities, were a popular item stolen. These knives, in conjunction with homemade weapons, were used in many of the documented assaults. The thefts which occurred were too numerous to be physically documented and as a result, a specific number could not be estimated.

4. Self-inflicted Wounds

There were numerous self-inflicted wounds which occurred from the assaults and fights within each center. These wounds included slashed wrists, slashed arms, and a cut abdomen. One refugee was found hanging from the fire escape with a rope made from sheets tied around his neck.

Another example occurred when a refugee died from his successful suicide attempt when he jumped from a tree.

V. DISCUSSION--CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

In this chapter the rationale for the serious incidents which occurred at all four centers will be analyzed in greater detail. Why were there rapes, unauthorized departures, a large number of assaults, a sophisticated weapons fabrication industry, riots, demonstrations, and suicide attempts? The documented explanations of these serious incidents in the past have been far too simple in that they fail to adequately consider the culture of the refugee. Many of the "official" reasons given for the occurrence of the serious incidents only scratch the surface of answering the question, why did they occur? We want to go beyond the superficial reasons found by officials and ask why these incidents took place. The incidents were examined through a cultural lense with primary and secondary source documents laying the foundation for analysis.

The perception of many officials regarding refugee operations is that they occur only once. This operation, as stated by a military official, is "unique" due to the fact that the slice of the population was atypical when compared to other refugee populations. He indicated that the serious incidents which occurred in the Cuban operation can not be generalized to other operations.*

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*Telephone interview with Department of the Army staff official.

Not true. Refugee managers have faced the same serious incidents in past refugee operations with a population that was considered a representative slice of the refugee's culture. Investigations into other operations has revealed that the same serious incidents, problems, and ill fated administrative policies occurred in the Vietnamese operation of the 1970's, the Cuban operation of the 1980's, and the Hatian operation of today. One conclusion which can be drawn from these operations is that we have failed to learn from past experiences.

The occurrence of serious incidents was cause for a primary focus of efforts by the managers and administrators of the centers. An inordinate amount of time was wasted reacting to serious incidents rather than managing the refugee population. Are there specific indicators which can be identified which contributed to the serious incidents? Were cultural considerations involved in the policy and management decisions? It is hoped the indicators presented in this chapter will help formulate answers to these questions and other cultural problems.

A. DEMOGRAPHICS

During the course of this investigation the most frequently found basis contributing to serious incidents of all types was the demographic makeup of the population. The interviews, press, and official documents all specify that serious

incidents resulted from the large number of "undesirables" that left Cuba voluntarily or by force. It is well documented that homosexuals, criminals, the mentally ill, and prostitutes were among the refugees who were processed at the centers. It is interesting to note that Castro classified all of these refugees as parasites during a radio address in May 1980, stating, "now Cuba has freed itself of its parasites."*

In retrospect one could easily be persuaded that demographics was the major plausible factor contributing to serious incidents during the Cuban operation. A detailed investigation reveals other relevant issues that must be addressed, and to blame demographics alone for all of the ills of the refugee centers if far too simple.

1. Classification

The classification of the refugee had direct impact on the person's assignment to a living area. This assignment generated the refugees' environment and created a catalyst for serious incidents. The initial demographic classification was a problem for all of the centers. At Fort Chaffee, for example, the lack of refugee demographic data prior to the start of the sustained refugee flow made it extremely difficult to plan and prepare for the segregation of family groups, unattached males, and unattached females into separate "neighborhoods". [Ref. 15: p. I-VII-M-1]

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*Interview with interpreter, August 19, 1982, Lacrosse, Wisconsin.

The prevalent demographic characteristic was the large percentage of males. At Fort McCoy and Fort Indiantown Gap the male population exceeded 90% and 80% respectively. A survey taken at the Eglin Center indicated the population consisted of 89.3% males, 64% of those being between the ages of 20 and 34 [Ref. 16: p. 42]. This large all male population made placement of refugees into our society difficult as opposed to the family groups who were readily accepted and sponsored by the American people. The fact that the Cuban population was mostly unattached males may have contributed to the perception that they were "misfits" or "undesirable".

While it seemed logical to segregate into the categories of family, unattached males, unattached females, and eventually juveniles without parent or guardian; the question is why should we segregate at all? Segregation was justified as a means of control and ensuring a "moral" environment. Applying our cultures' definition to another culture can be elucidated by the criterion used for determining classification of "family" and "juvenile". In our culture the family means husband, wife, and children, while the Cuban culture the family has a much broader connotation and includes aunts, uncles, and cousins. In a legalistic society defining a juvenile is rather simple--anyone under 18 years of age.

But in Cuba many of the juveniles were on their own and had been totally self sufficient for years.*

The creation of "neighborhoods" by a rigid low-context system can be considered a primary cause for the continuous fence jumping. Males continually moved from assigned areas into family areas and unattached female areas. All of the centers experienced some form of unauthorized refugee movement. This movement resulted in prostitution, acts of violence, constant tension and frustration [Ref. 17: p. 31]. While there may have been options to the classification and initial assignments, would the American public accept juveniles or single females housed with the males? Compounding the situation--the refugees failed to see fence jumping as bad.**

There are great individual and cultural differences in spatial needs. The families were given a larger living space and some privacy, while unaccompanied males were housed in long rows of crowded barracks laid out in grid fashion. There were wide differences in the refugee population, as mentioned earlier. According to E. T. Hall, aggression often increases when living in close quarters. In such circumstances, man's energies must be tuned to channeling aggression so that

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*The term "street kids" was used by many of the people interviewed to describe the juveniles.

**Interviews with 9 refugees, August 19 and 20, 1982, Sparta, Wisconsin.

it is not continually being triggered [Ref. 12: p. 138]. Little effort was made in channeling the refugee's aggression because their stay was thought to be temporary.

One variable overlooked initially at Fort McCoy was the internal Cuban demographic based on geography. For example, the gangs and groups from Havana had a hatred or dislike for those from Santiago resulting in internal strife that continued in the refugee centers. Perhaps if known earlier, the centers could be established on a cultural basis derived from information provided by the refugee population itself. For example, refugees with common geographic ties could be collocated in the center.

2. Undesirables

The most advertised peculiarity of the freedom flotilla was the alleged high number of "undesirables". It was reported that at least 5,000 had admitted prison records and that others were avowed homosexuals. Immigration officials recorded 16.4%, or 152 of the sampled refugees at Eglin had spent some time in jail. Less than half, however, were in prison at the time of departure. [Ref. 16: p. 43] The debate over what is a criminal again illustrates our low-context reliance on rules. What did a prison record in Cuba really mean? There were also claims of communist agitators in the centers with most of the claims being generated from the refugees themselves. For example, at Fort McCoy, refugees were segregated because

fellow refugees had described them as "anti-American agitators." Approximately 30 of these refugees had to be placed in separate barracks under guard for their own self protection [Ref. 18: p. 1].

All of the sources* implied that homosexuals, murderers, prostitutes, and the mentally ill contributed to the problems but provided little specifics. All interviews indicated these were major problems but admitted the classification or identification of "undesirables" would be unrealistic considering the time available and uncontrollable outside factors.

In contrast to this analysis, one study that concluded the refugees' experience in Cuba do not justify the alarming charges of social undesirability, especially in terms of their occupational histories [Ref. 16: p. 44]. The extent to which the undesirables contributed to serious incidents is ambiguous at best. The negative influence they had on the centers was normally described in broad and general statements.

B. PROCESSING

Processing** was an area of great concern for the refugees and management. With the exception of mass riots and

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*Sources included interviews, after action reports, press reports, and official message traffic.

**Processing in this text refers to both in and out processing. Many of the problems are similar in nature and have a cumulative effect.

demonstrations, processing acquired the most visibility from the "outside world". The press, relatives, friends and those who wished to sponsor a refugee sought glimpses of the refugees upon arrival at the centers. Many of the friends and relatives of the refugees expected them to be processed out of the center within a few days. The refugees themselves expected the processing to be faster than it actually was. Each center organized the processing procedures independently. However, many similar concerns surfaced.

1. Expectations

As with all rational bureaucratic operations there was a plethora of administrative requirements to accomplish before a refugee was authorized to enter or leave the center. As the refugees arrived many had raised expectations that they would be rapidly resettled. As one refugee said, "I am in the land of freedom. I can have a car, marry an American girl and in 6 months have a house. Everything is easy in America." The expectation of early sponsorship was continually reinforced by the interpreters at the processing locations. Another refugee responded in this way to his newly formed expectations: "I'm full of hope," said Hugo Landa, 27, an engineering student in Cuba. "I think this country is large and full of opportunities. Perhaps I will clean the toilets, or be a millionaire." [Ref. 5: p. 42]

After weeks of remaining in the centers with little if any progress made in meeting these expectations, the

Figure 5.1. Refugee Arrival at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, June, 1980.

refugees became impatient. As a result of the temperamental characteristics of the Cuban culture combined with the frustrating experience of unfulfilled expectations, their anger was communicated through action. This anger took the form of riots, demonstrations, and other acts of violence. The net effect of not having their expectations filled was for the Cubans to hold back until they could stand it no longer and then strike out, thus completing an action chain [Ref. 12: p. 158].

2. Interpreters

Qualified interpreters were difficult to obtain. They had a critical role in the operation. Time constraints and total numbers required hampered the acquisition of "quality" interpreters. In an interview, one interpreter indicated that there was in excess of 800 interpreters at the Fort McCoy center. She also said that translation ability had little or no influence in the pay, position, or responsibility of the interpreter. In addition, interpreter job performance was rarely if ever examined.

The interpreters were located by numerous methods and their skills ranged from professors at the local universities to second year high school Spanish students. It was noted that many of the refugees had difficulty understanding the questions asked by the interpreters. Some refugees were lucky to have the more proficient interpreters while others suffered with those available. Common errors due to the lack of linguistic skills possessed by the interpreters resulted in inaccurate and incomplete documentation. For example, some interpreters could not obtain the proper last name from the refugee or his proper occupation.* How much of the information recorded by the interpreters was accurate?

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*Interviews with interpreter, August 19, 1982, Lacrosse, Wisconsin, and interpreter, August 20, 1982, Sparta, Wisconsin.

How many refugees were misclassified? How many families were separated due to the lack of skills possessed by the interpreters?

It must be noted the interpreters' role was critical to the successful accomplishment of the operation. It was the interpreters who initially classified the majority of the refugees. Interpreters determined where the refugees were to be located in the center, if other members of the family accompanied them, any immediate medical problems, and their prior arrest records. The thoroughness of their processing procedures influenced the length of stay for the refugee at the center. For example, errors in recording skills of the refugees or names of friends and relatives in the United States could greatly limit the possibility of sponsorship. All of this data would have a direct impact on the refugee's future.

3. Contexting

Failure to take contexting differences into account can cause problems. In the refugee operation, for example, there was a high-context culture being misclassified under the designs and whims of a low-context culture. The majority of the interpreters came from a low-context culture as opposed to the refugees who came from a high-context culture. Context is just one of many ways of looking at behavior [Ref. 12: p. 113].

High-context culture (Cuban) makes greater distinction between insiders and outsiders. People in positions of authority take full responsibility for their actions. They also tend to be polychronic; that is, they are likely to be involved in a variety of activities with several different people at any given time. On the other hand, low-context cultures (interpreters, managers of centers, military officials) do not place a great distinction between insiders and outsiders. People in positions of authority diffuse responsibility to lowest possible levels. They are monochronic in nature; that is, one thing at a time. The two systems--low-context and high-context can be compared to oil and water; they do not mix [Ref. 12: p. 150].

One point that needs to be emphasized is that on arrival the refugees were told by a low-context, monochronic person that they would be in the refugee center for a few days, maybe a week. This type of reference to time has a different meaning to a culture which is polychronic.

In one instance, the refugees were given specific time schedules to meet for meals, clothing issue, and transportation. The refugees did not comply with these schedules forcing the center to operate these activities on an unscheduled basis [Ref. 15: p. I-VII-J-1]. Thus, the center was transformed from monochronic to polychronic in nature without realizing what had taken place. Failure to take into account

contexting could be a contributing factor leading to serious incidents. As E. T. Hall said in his book, Beyond Culture, if a low-context person interacts with a high-context culture and does not really think things through to foresee all contingencies, he is headed for trouble [Ref. 12: p. 127].

C. INTERNAL CONFLICT

As the population in each center increased with unanticipated speed so did the frustrations, misunderstandings, expectations of sponsorship, and the anxiety level. The "newness" of the refugee center rapidly deteriorated as the reality of the slow processing procedures became apparent. As a result internal conflicts* increased and ranged from simple thefts of cigarettes to pay for gambling debts to stabbings of alleged Castro agents.

1. Self Protection

A major concern of the managers was the abundance of weapons the refugees acquired. This is an interesting facet of the refugee's culture contrasted to that of the center's administration. To the Cubans, "You are not a man unless you have a knife."** In the United States culture, a person possessing knives may be perceived as a criminal.

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*Refugee vs refugee (totally within the center).

**Interview with refugee (August 20, 1982, Sparta, Wisconsin.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, an astonishing number of weapons were found. Why did the Cubans have these weapons and from whom did they acquire them? The great availability of material within the refugee housing area that can be converted into deadly weapons makes the control of such weapons impractical, if not impossible. This led to a significant number of serious assaults between refugees and posed a threat to military and civilian personnel working inside the refugee areas. Incidents of violence increased proportionately as the "more desirable" refugees were resettled first, leaving behind those who were "less desirable" to become increasingly frustrated and perhaps more hostile the longer they remained. [Ref. 17: p. 17]

The possession of weapons was justified by the refugees as being needed for self defense. Some incidents apparently occurred in the Cuban prisons and now there was an opportunity to "pay back" those harmed. Another refugee said, "I remember your face. I may have been unable at the time to fight you, but I remember your face and there will be a time I will be able to kill you."*

There were specific incidents in which refugees tried to purposely wound themselves. While some cases were attributed to those who were mentally ill, there was speculation

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*Interview with 3 refugees August 20, 1982, Sparta, Wisconsin.

among medical personnel that other documented cases were an attempt to avoid physical harm by other refugees.

2. Temperament

The temperament of a people's culture must be taken into consideration when a large number are confined in a small areas as were the Cuban refugees. In particular, two characteristics of the Latin culture were paramount in the refugee operation and may be one of the major causes of assaults, riots and demonstrations, and the refugee's perceived need for weapons. These are: self esteem and possession of a quick temper. As an interpreter said, "Latins are hot blooded and proud."

Perhaps these two characteristics led participants to feel that fighting was a way of life for the refugees. It is interesting to note that all the personnel involved in the refugee operation, including the refugees, indicated that fighting is a common occurrence in the Cuban culture.* The seriousness of the fighting is determined by the observers of the culture. What appears to be fighting and serious to one culture may be irrelevant to another.

An illustration occurred during the showing of motion pictures at Fort McCoy. When the projection equipment failed the refugees began yelling and waving their arms. The uniformed American operators interpreted this as the beginning

*See Appendix E (Culture).

riot. On several occasions crowds would form and become unruly. Upon investigation of the incidents it became obvious that in Cuba a projectionist with equipment problems can expect verbal harrassment, but nothing more [Ref. 19: p. 3].

3. Geography

Another reason for conflict between the refugee population was the two distinct cultures in the population. One was from the city of Santiago and was considered the less educated, the peasants, the less wealthy of the Cuban culture. The other faction came from Havana which was the more educated, the skilled workers, and the wealthy. These two factions did not trust nor did they like each other. As a result a great deal of internal conflict resulted.*

4. Government

Upon arrival there was an immediate need to structure an organization which would function as a communication link to the refugees in the center. How was this internal government established? The initial Cuban leadership was selected based on demonstrated leadership and reliance on known political prisoners with leadership ability [Ref. 19: p. 3]. Since a political prisoner would espouse to the U.S. ways, he would seem a logical choice for placement into a leadership position. The problem faced by the management was identifying refugees who were political prisoners. Complicating this

*From interviews, See Appendix E.

problem was the potential for selecting a number of Castro agents who were among the refugees. The identification of the initial leaders was an extremely difficult process.

Another criterion used to identify the initial leadership for the internal government consisted of education and technical or skill level. Who would be among the first sponsored out of the center? Educated personnel, technical or skilled workers were the first to be sponsored. As Cubans were sponsored from the center, internal groups replaced the leaders. These groups developed a strong power structure within the center. Some of the internal government consisted of hardened criminals who used their position to abuse other refugees.

As an example, at Fort McCoy the requirement to provide an internal security force capable of instantaneous reaction to either prevent a crime of violence or to provide normal police functions within the Cuban population was met by forming a force identified through the use of purple windbreakers. The windbreakers rapidly became both a status symbol and a point of dissention with the Cuban community. The visibility of the jackets at every incident caused mixed notoriety for this force [Ref. 17: p. 24]. This internal government was known to have established its own prison in a barracks building. Such actions illustrated how the internal government abused its power. They were more engrossed

with power and politics than meeting the needs of the refugee. Eventually this group was dissolved.*

This abuse among the refugees and the constant shift of "power" within the rival gangs formed a constant threat to internal peace. Numerous gang coups occurred during the later stages of the operation. Internal conflict seemed an accepted norm for the refugee and may be indicative of their environments in Cuba.

Figure 5.2. Fort McCoy Internal Security Force, July 1980.

*Interview with senior military official.

5. Material Equity

The lack of materialistic uniformity posed another concern for the administrators of the centers. In conjunction with card playing; gambling, prostitution, drug sales, weapons sales also occurred. The refugees paid for these items in a variety of ways; cash they brought from Cuba, barter with materials issued by the center, and mail from friends and relatives in the United States. Meal cards and cigarettes, for example, were particularly popular barter items. As a result of the informal bartering system and an unequal distribution of wealth among the refugees the temptation to steal increased. In fact, the thefts were so numerous they became impossible to control and document.

There is little doubt that internal conflict contributed to serious incidents at the refugee centers. In fact, some of the most violent and serious events occurred between the refugees themselves. These incidents created a negative environment for the centers and negative perceptions about the refugees. The underlying causes of the internal conflict surfaced from the refugee's need of self protection, geographic cultural differences, the internal government, and the lack of material equity.

D. LAW ENFORCEMENT

The ineffective and poorly coordinated law enforcement system was incapable of anticipating, controlling, and

preventing serious incidents. The number of agencies involved with various degrees of jurisdiction at the centers was a major concern. The primary agencies involved at all centers were United States Marshalls, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Military Police. There were secondary agencies involved to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Park Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Protective Service, and various private sector security guards.

1. Legal Considerations

During the conduct of the refugee operations a multitude of legal issues developed about the "legal rights and status" of the refugee. There were also many legal issues centered on the "legitimacy" of the various law enforcement agencies. With North Americans being a low-context society, many times they cannot state explicitly what the rules are. They can only point to them when they are violated [Ref. 7: p. 51]. In the case of the refugee centers we not only failed to establish what the rules were, but also could not decide who should enforce them. For the military, this proved to be a continuous and sensitive issue. The ambiguous legal status of the "refugees" and the role of the military regarding their authority and jurisdiction prevented quick establishment and rigorous enforcement of rules, regulations and laws [Ref. 17: p. 19]. The tasking message on June 3, 1980, stated

that the civilian law enforcement authorities had primary responsibility for peacekeeping, law enforcement, and related activities. It also tasked military commanders to provide the manpower when the capability of the civilian agencies was exceeded. These agencies were continually understaffed. [Ref. 19: p. 4]

At Fort McCoy there was a necessity to use military police inside the refugee enclave as a visible crime prevention force but this force had no real authority. Military authorities could not perform the most critical functions of law enforcement due to legal constraints and Department of Defense regulations. These critical functions included conducting investigations, making arrests within the centers, maintaining and guarding detention facilities. [Ref. 17: pp. 17-19]

These legal ambiguities were not unique to the Cuban operation. For example, in the Vietnamese operation the lack of clear-cut authority and jurisdiction was dangerous in that it was quickly perceived and exploited by those refugees bent on making trouble [Ref. 20: p. I-V-I-1].

Interviews with civil affairs personnel, two of the four installation commanders, and two mess hall workers revealed that law enforcement structure was an ineffective bureaucracy. The military was in a "no win" situation; that is, either letting serious incidents occur on their

installations or violating legal restrictions and regulations in an attempt to control them.

2. Punishment

A major headache for management was to prevent unauthorized departures. The strategy consisted of installing fences (see Figure 5.3) and surrounding the fences with security forces. When a violator was caught he was placed in a more secure detention facility. The effort to contain refugees was illustrated by the series of events concerning the enclosure of the Fort McCoy center. Initially the barbed wire was not installed to prevent the "concentration camp" image. However, after the Fort Chaffee disturbance August 5, 1980, little or no objections were raised to the barbed wire being placed on the fence. [Ref. 19: p. 2]

The communities surrounding the refugee centers had deep interests in the number of unauthorized departures, thus a majority of the military effort and resources was expended on deterring and controlling fence jumping. This effort was ineffective because placing refugees in a separate and more secure section of the center had little effect on the refugee. For example, an interviewed refugee said that he was treated very nice in the detention facility and this was not considered as punishment to him.

Another problem for the administration was the inability to classify a refugee as a "troublemaker" and to determine effective punishment for rule violations. As

Figure 5.3. Juvenile Section Fence, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

punishment remained either meaningless or nonexistent, other acts of violence which included stabbings, prostitution, and indecent exposure increased [Ref. 19: p. 4].

3. Staffing

The civilian agencies were consistently understaffed. In addition, most of their personnel had little or no experience in the basic principles of refugee or confinement operations. Detention of minor offenders; that is, fence jumpers,

was initially a matter of confusion as federal agency staffing could not accommodate an additional category of offenders. For example, at Fort McCoy a decision was made to hire guard personnel under the auspices of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The qualifications of this force were questionable. Another law enforcement force had to be hired [Ref. 19: p. 4].

The problem of how to handle punishment and staff the law enforcement agencies was not unique to the Cuban operation. During the Vietnamese operation (1975) the same problems with inexperienced security forces caused quite similar concerns [Ref. 21: p. 114].

The lack of a uniform and coordinated law enforcement plan of action to include a properly trained staff contributed to a majority of the serious incidents. By not taking meaningful action against offenders, the refugee may have interpreted this as approval for undesirable behavior.

E. COMMUNICATIONS

There were several communication issues that related to the potential for serious incidents. One of the key elements in any successful refugee operation is the ability to effectively communicate with the refugees. A critical element of that communication is trust, and for the communication to be effective the source must be seen as reliable by the receiver.

1. Sources

Many forms of communications were used in the centers to include bulletin boards, public address systems, Spanish newspapers*, Spanish radio stations, internal government, interpreters, telephones with Spanish operators, motion pictures, Spanish speaking government officials, and Spanish speaking law enforcement officials. What is the probability of the refugee interpreting the meaning from all these sources as being consistent to him and his culture?

Due to the impersonal nature of these patterns these communication techniques resembled those used in Cuba and developed little trust between the sender and the receiver. These communication techniques were American in content and did little to join the high-context, polychronic receiver with the low-context, monochronic sender. These communication patterns were on the technical level of Hall's TRIAD. The use of informal communications by the refugees finally bridged the gap.

Considering the rotation of military personnel and units**, informal communication patterns were never clearly understood. This failure to establish complete and trustworthy communication channels resulted in needless broken

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*Center newspapers were produced tailored to each center.

**Reserve units rotated normally every two weeks, and many active duty personnel were rotated every ninety days.

action chains. As Rene Spitz, the Swiss psychiatrist states,

> If human beings are put in the position of having to cope with the consequences of too many broken action chains they will compensate. The compensations will ultimately become so numerous as to block or prohibit NORMAL behavior. The culmination of this process he calls derailment of dialogue, a term that indicates not only words but actions as well. [Ref. 12: p. 148]

2. Rumors

Information was transmitted to the refugees by a variety of informal sources. The informal sources were the internal security patrols, dining facilities workers, interpreters, and other civilian workers in the center. The majority of information was factual, but too often it degenerated into rumor or reinforced existing rumors. Examples of these rumors include:

"You will be out in four or five days."

"There is a whore house nearby."

"When Reagan is elected, he will ship us back."

"They are going to turn Fort McCoy into a prison."

"Volunteer agencies are selling sponsorships."

The majority of the rumors were unsubstantiated, but because they were transmitted in the informal network, they were accepted. Rumors such as being shipped back to Cuba, and the centers being transformed into prisons were a major contributing factor to the number of unauthorized departures, riots, and demonstrations.

Rumors concerning the refugee's future (specifically gaining sponsorship) could be directly linked to the cause of riots and demonstrations. For example, there were rumors circulating in the Fort McCoy center that a person from one of the VOLAGs was selling refugees. This started a demonstration where approximately 300 refugees carried signs saying they had not come to the United States to be sold like cows and horses [Ref. 22: p. 1].

These particular problems are not unique. An identical incident occurred with the Vietnamese refugee on July 16, 1975 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, where 300 refugees participated in a demonstration sparked by charges that one of the VOLAGs used favoritism in determining the resettlement of certain refugees [Ref. 20: p. IV-XII-1].

It should be noted the communications section refers to the specific topic areas concerning the sources and rumors. The communications issue is much more complex and is immersed in other areas to include demographics, processing, internal conflict, and law enforcement. The ability or inability to transfer information from one culture to another was pervasive in the majority of serious incidents which occurred.

VI. CONCLUSION

The ability to understand other cultures will provide a better understanding of our own culture. Specifically, in any refugee operation, cultural concerns for the operation of the centers should be a major issue addressed by management. For management to be aware of the idea that people from different cultures think differently is a key ingredient for the success of any refugee operation. One point we have discovered from past refugee operations is that we have failed to learn from them and we continue to make the same mistakes. In particular, we have failed to anticipate and control serious incidents as well as recognize the contributing factors to those incidents. The differences between the Cuban refugee operation and past refugee operations have not been that great. Serious incidents were a common occurrence in all of the Cuban refugee centers and were the catalyst which led to the development of the list of contributing factors.

A. THE SERIOUS INCIDENTS

The serious incidents which were found to be prevalent in all centers were unauthorized departures, assaults and weapons possession, riots and demonstrations, and other individual acts of violence. All of these incidents raised the anxiety and concerns of the American public, the center's management, and the refugee population.

Why are these serious incidents important? They illustrate the serious impact when two cultures collide in a time intense, high anxiety, severely stressful environment. These serious incidents served as the catalyst for investigating the contributing factors.

B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

The contributing factors to the serious incidents were analyzed using the cultural concepts of E. T. Hall. The areas which have been identified as contributing factors to serious incidents are population characteristics, processing, internal conflict, law enforcement, and communication. For each of these areas a series of questions can be asked to highlight the cultural relevancy. The following list was developed not as an all inclusive traditional checklist, but rather a tool to aid management in coping with the undesirable phenomena in a multi-culture environment.

Population Characteristics

How will the refugee be classified upon arrival and what are the implications of the classification?

When assigning living areas what cultural specifics should be taken into consideration?

What attributes make a refugee "undesirable" and what special considerations must be taken?

How will the refugees' demographic composition impact on planning?

Processing

What will be the refugee's expectations of the center and the nation?

What will be the management's expectations of the refugee and his culture?

What will the qualifications be for interpreters?

Will the interpreters, with the skill they possess, properly classify refugees?

How will the interpreters' performance be evaluated?

How will the characteristics of the refugee and his culture influence the classification?

How will processing decisions and procedures be affected by the refugee's culture?

How will context (high/low) be taken into consideration when processing refugees?

Will the refugee population be polychronic or monochronic?

How will refugee's time frame of reference be taken into consideration when making plans and schedules?

Internal Conflict

Will the refugees feel the need for self protection and why?

What plan will be used to control weapons/drugs?

Will internal dissention which began in their homeland be a relevant factor to consider?

Will there be a need for an internal government and if so, how will it be established?

What will be the role of the internal government and how will it provide feedback to management?

What action will be taken to prevent the internal government from abusing its power?

Will there be a need to ensure material equity?

Law Enforcement

Who will be in charge and how will the law enforcement needs be coordinated?

What will be the impact of the legal environment on management of the refugees?

Will there be a need for punishment and who will administer it?

What will the refugee's perception of punishment entail?

How will the "concentration camp image" be avoided?

How will teh law enforcement agencies be staffed?

Communication

How will we communicate with the refugee using both formal and informal methods?

How will we develop a trust with the refugee?

How will disruptive rumors be controlled?

C. COMPENDIUM

People from different cultures have unconscious, ingrained assumptions about personal space, interpersonal relations, and the function of time. These different assumptions make misunderstanding between peoples likely and destructive. The Cuban refugee operation is an outstanding example of how these misunderstandings evolved into serious incidents. Although the large number of serious incidents appear to reflect poorly on the Cuban culture; the question that should be addressed is how many of these were brought about because of

cultural interaction? It must be remembered that the majority of the refugees did not come with the intent to commit serious incidents.

The list of cultural considerations and questions may be an initial step in the preparation for any type of multicultural operation. Can one be totally prepared for such operations? Probably not, but the questions might be worth considering. Unfortunately, there are more questions than answers, but at some time, possibly sooner than we like, we will be forced to find the answers.

Figure 6.1. Refugees at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin on July 4, 1980.

APPENDIX A

FORT MCCOY SERIOUS INCIDENTS

6 June 1980

Numerous incidents of Cubans attempting to scale fence. Two military policemen received minor injuries.

8 June 1980

A warehouse building destroyed by fire.

11 June 1980

7 Cubans found off post.

12 June 1980

3 Cubans sent to a hospital in critical condition for drinking illegal homemade liquor. Two small disturbances quelled.

13 June 1980

9 Cubans escaped from medium security detention facility.

15 June 1980

13 Cubans escaped from detention facility. A number of Cubans have self inflicted cuts. Doctors claim they are feigning suicide attempts.

17 June 1980

Two interpreters attempt to smuggle refugee out of the center.

18 June 1980

2 Cubans apprehended for altercation with weapons.

19 June 1980

Unaccompanied juveniles are relocated for more control and protection.

22 June 1980

Numerous incidents of fence jumping occurred.

23 June 1980

Knife fight involving two Cubans occurred. An unknown number of juveniles attached their barracks chief with weapons. A refugee accused of being a "Castro agent" taken into custody.

25 June 1980

89 refugees having criminal histories were transferred to federal prison. One Cuban attempted suicide and 53 improvised weapons were confiscated.

26 June 1980

22 homemade weapons were found in juvenile barracks.

13 August 1980

A series of clashes between refugee groups occurred involving 50 to 60 personnel. Approximately 20 refugees were treated for injuries.

14 August 1980

Two buildings damaged by fire, arson suspected.

1 September 1980

A disturbance in the refugee holding occurred as refugees attempted to rid themselves of a previous internal security force.

2 September 1980

Disturbances from previous day continued.

7 September 1980

300 refugees participated in a demonstration over slow out processing procedures. Two thirds of the fencing around the male section was torn down. Two recreation buildings were damaged by fire, arson suspected.

8 September 1980

Building damaged by fire, arson suspected. Small demonstration of approximately 100 refugees occurred with 23 instigators being apprehended.

9 September 1980

Refugees restored the downed fence.

9 September 1980

Seven refugees escaped detention area.

22 September 1980

Building damaged by fire in juvenile area, arson suspected.

29 September 1980

Six Cubans escaped from detention facility.

APPENDIX B

FORT CHAFFEE SERIOUS INCIDENTS

26 May 1980

A demonstration involving 200 to 300 Cubans, mostly young males, occurred. Barriers were overturned and four Cubans received injuries.

28 May 1980

Demonstration occurred by an estimated 1200 Cubans over slow out processing.

30 May 1980

200 Cubans peacefully demonstrated along the main street on the post.

31 May 1980

Approximately 50 to 70 Cubans stoned a vehicle belonging to the U.S. Marshall. One fire was set near a barracks building.

1 June 1980

A group of 1000 refugees marched to the main gate and for reasons unknown, state troopers opened fire and wounded five Cubans.

5 June 1980

200 families waiting for refugees demonstrated peacefully outside the post. One Cuban arrested for armed robbery.

6 June 1980

Over 1400 homemade weapons were confiscated.

8 June 1980

60 Cubans transferred to federal facilities.

9 June 1980

Four refugees arrested for weapons possession, one for attempted sodomy, one for robbery, and one for attempting to incite a riot.

12 June 1980

31 Cubans detained as troublemakers were transferred to federal facilities.

13 June 1980

Two Cubans attempted to escape from detention facility.

APPENDIX C

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SERIOUS INCIDENTS

5 June 1980

Two Cubans apprehended for breaking and entering residence of Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania.

6 June 1980

Cubans continued to be apprehended by local officials. Two Cubans were identified as agitators.

9 June 1980

23 attempted fence jumpings and five destruction of government property incidents were reported.

10 June 1980

Fence jumpings continued to occur.

16 June 1980

One Cuban admitted to hospital with stab wounds.

17 June 1980

Three Cubans apprehended off pot.

20 June 1980

Mess hall burglarized; 8 knives stolen.

23 June 1980

Numerous weapons were voluntarily turned in by the Cubans in the family section.

5 August 1980

A major riot/demonstration occurred.

APPENDIX D

EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE SERIOUS INCIDENTS

13 May 1980

Four refugees attacked another refugee, who was alleged to be a Castro agent. A riot occurred of 200 to 300 refugees throwing debris.

15 May 1980

A commander request action to expedite out processing due to the potentially dangerous environment.

25 May 1980

200 refugees involved in a rock throwing protest. Three air policemen and six refugees received injuries.

APPENDIX E

INTERVIEWS

There were two interpreters interviewed who worked at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, during the summer of 1980. They translated at the processing stations during the initial phase as well as with the juveniles during latter phases. They were interviewed on August 19 and 20, 1982, in Wisconsin.

The military officials interviewed represented a variety of positions, responsibilities, and rank. Specifically, two installation commanders, a key administrative advisor, a primary staff officer, and a number of officials in the Department of Defense were interviewed.

A civil affairs unit played an integral part in the establishment of Fort McCoy as a viable refugee center. Ten members of that unit were interviewed on August 21, 1982, in Green Bay, Wisconsin. There was one civil affairs civilian who participated in the operation also interviewed.

Eleven Cubans were interviewed who were refugees at the centers: 9 were at the Fort McCoy center, one at Fort Indiantown Gap center, and one at Fort Chaffee center.

There was a number of support employees who participated in the operation regarding the dining facilities. We interviewed two--one, a supervisor over the entire food service operation, and another who operated a dining facility. Both served at Fort McCoy for the entire operation.

The following statements summarize the data gathered from personal interviews. Source codes are positioned at the end of each statement. The following table lists the codes used to catalog common perceptions of those interviewed.

TABLE I

LEGEND

Refugees	(R)
Food Service	(F)
Military	(M)
Interpreters	(I)
Civil affairs military	(CM)
Civil affairs civilian	(CC)

Population Characteristics

The following are statements and comments from those interviewed concerning the characteristics of the population in the refugee centers. These were used as the foundation for the development of the contributing factors of the serious incidents.

Many did not know how to sign name (I)

Families were ashamed of the parasites in the center (I)

99% of the fights involved "lower class" refugees (I)

Homosexuals and juveniles were involved in riots and demonstrations (I)

Educated refugees were from Havana (I,F,R)

Poorly educated refugees were from Santiago (I,F,R)

Fence separated refugees (F,CA,R,M)

Juveniles were "street kids" (F,M)

Refugees from Havana and Santiago were considered enemies (I,F,CA,R,M)

Problems with identification of family and relatives (I,CA,M)

Homosexuals, murderers, prostitutes, contributed to problems (I,CA,R,M)

Underground for homosexual accuterments (CA)

Mental illness was present (I,CA,M)

Cuba's parasites were sent by Castro (I,M)

Questionable release of political prisoners (I)

Some criminals were guilty of minor offenses (I,M)

Prison mentality (CA,M)

Political prisoners not allowed to come to U.S. (R)

Processing

The statements in the processing section concern both in and out processing. Processing is a critical activity for the managers of the refugee centers. The interview results illustrate the multitude of issues which need consideration.

Military interpreters were a valuable asset (CA,M)

Jumped fences to look for sponsors (F,R)

Difficult to identify criminals (I,CA,M)

Refugees were classified by the way they looked (I,CA)

Many gave up hope of sponsorship after dealing with numerous agencies (I,R,M)

Classified into wrong compounds (I,R)

Slow processing procedures (I,F,CA,M,R)

Impatient refugees with respect to administrative procedures (I,R,M)

Afraid of being sent to other refugee facilities in U.S. (R)

Criminals and juveniles were not separated effectively (I)

Inadequate interpreter skills led to misclassification (I,M,R)

Initially interpreters were not qualified to translate (I,M,R)

Raised expectations with respect to sponsorship possibility (I,F,CA,R)

5-10 days refugees became disenchanted (I,R)

There was confusion about classification of "families" (I,R)

Too many officials were in charge (I,F,CA,M)

Too much administration (I,M)

No uniform rules for processing among the various agencies (I,CA,M)

To a refugee "in a while" has little meaning in reference to time (I,CA,R)

Internal Conflict

The majority of those interviewed were quick to point out their perceptions of causes of conflict among the refugees. Many of the comments came from interviews with the Civil Affairs personnel and military officials.

Hospital visits increased due to fear within the center (CA)

Any time a mass of people are grouped in an area, conflict results (M)

Created weapons for self protection (F,CA,R,M)

Factions were in constant conflict (F,CA,M)

Hats were symbols of authority (F,CA,M)

Former prisoners tended to migrate to old gangs (CA,M)

Internal conflict was spontaneous (CA,M)

Internal government acted as dictators (F,R,M)

Castro agents were confronted by fellow refugees (I,CA,M)

Lower class people punch each other (I)

Internal government was a focal point (I,CA)

Mobs of deprived refugees would try to rape each other (I,M)

Internal government consisted of hardened criminals (I,CA,M)

Lack of materialistic uniformity (I,F,CA,R,M)

Gambling (CA,R,M)

Enforcement

While the after action reports were concerned with the jurisdiction and legal issues involving the enforcement agencies, the interview results indicate a concern with perceived lack of punishment.

No standardized punishment for fence jumping (M)

Agencies and units understaffed (CA,M)

Bureaucracy inhibited law enforcement (F,CA,M)

Light punishment for fence jumping (I,R,M)

Lack of uniformity labeling troublemakers (I,CA,M)

No segregation in detention compounds (I)

Light, if any, punishment for stealing from each other (I,M)

Feared Fort McCoy would be turned into Cuban prison (R)

Culture and Communication

Culture is communication. The interview results illustrate the different perceptions we have of the Cuban culture as well as their perceptions of our culture.

Political rumors; i.e. Reagan's possible election, incited unauthorized departues (R)

Personnel turbulence contributed to lack of trust and confusion (CA)

No respect for property (F,M)

Boredom (F,CA,M)

Latins are hot blooded and proud (I,R,M)

Fighting is part of their life (I,F,M,R,M)

Scared of military (F,M)

Military/government jargon; i.e. acronyms (F)

Knives are part of their life (F,M,R)

Juveniles were temperamental (I)

Cubans are a strong race (I)

Frustration was released by anger (I,M)

Possessed hatred for "the fence" (F,R,M)

Refugees' perception of U.S.:

"1967 refugees were successful" (M)

"Money paper in trees" (I)

"We came for freedom" (F,CA,M,R,I,CC)

"Anybody gets rich in U.S." (I,F)

"Everything easy, 6 months a house, car, money in bank" (I,R)

"All that was on their mind was to marry American girl" (I,R)

"For the first time I now have all my clothes" (CA,R)

No continuity of agency management (I,M)

Treated as a piece of furniture...moved from one section to another in the compound (I)

Girls in Cuba more passive (I)

Boys in Cuba more active (I)

American girls and Cuban males interpreted each other differently (I,F,M)

Stupidity caused near fatal accidents (drinking antifreeze) (I,CA,M)

Refugees wanted to see the country (R)

Refugees did not think they needed second language (I)

Lack of control over interpreters' duties (I,F)

Sexual obsession with female workers (F,M)

Entire operation was a "human disaster (M)

Undesirable information was "filtered" before it reached key decision makers (M)

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